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INTRODUCTION

When industrial employees are injured by exposure to harmful
materials, they often sue not only their employer, but the original
supplier of the materials as well. Failure to warn claims constitute a
major part of these industrial lawsuits, which help keep failure to
1
warn among the most frequently filed products liability actions.
Minnesota currently allows plaintiffs to hold suppliers of raw
2
materials liable for failure to warn. Because Minnesota products
3
liability law is still incomplete, however, these industrial suppliers
4
are subject to an inefficient, often confusing set of legal standards.
5
In Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., a decision likely to provide
some clarification and assistance to industrial suppliers, the
Minnesota Supreme Court designed a multi-faceted approach for
analyzing failure to warn litigation. While retaining a negligencebased methodology, the court identified specific defenses available
under “common fact patterns” found in industrial failure to warn
6
litigation. Some of the defenses—those most closely related to the
actions, knowledge, or abilities of the plaintiff—absolve the
7
defendant of any duty to warn. Others, relating to the actions,
knowledge, or abilities of intermediaries, are more fact-specific,
8
The
requiring the balancing of a number of elements.
sophisticated intermediary doctrine—the primary focus of this
Note—belongs in the latter category of defenses.
9
The Gray court limited its holding to the facts of the case, but
1. Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User
Defense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1988).
2. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004) (citing
Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987)).
3. Mike Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law
and The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 2
(1998) (comparing existing Minnesota products liability law to the new
Restatement (Third)).
4. See, e.g., Carole A. Cheney, Comment, Not Just for Doctors: Applying the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine to the Relationship between Chemical Manufacturers,
Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 562, 563 (1991) (discussing
inefficiencies in tort system relating to industrial failure to warn actions).
5. 676 N.W.2d at 268.
6. Id. at 275.
7. See infra Parts III.B–C.
8. See infra Parts III.D–E, IV.
9. 676 N.W.2d at 281.
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its adoption of specific defenses will no doubt shape future
litigation. Taken as a whole, the defenses acknowledge the
difficulties
facing
industrial
defendant-suppliers
without
eliminating protection for potential plaintiff-employees. As a
result, they should lead to more equitable results in industrial
failure to warn litigation.
This Note briefly examines the context of Minnesota failure to
warn claims against industrial suppliers. It describes the various
defenses Gray has made available, particularly the sophisticated
intermediary and bulk supplier doctrines. The Note also reviews
the various jurisdictional incarnations of the sophisticated
intermediary defense, and analyzes the doctrine’s application in
Gray. Additionally, the Note attempts to predict Gray’s future,
recommending that the sophisticated intermediary defense not be
expanded beyond the employment context, and suggesting that the
Gray defenses, viewed as a cohesive whole, will quickly get rid of
weaker claims while permitting valid claims to go forward. Finally,
the Note concludes that the multi-faceted approach adopted in
Gray should permit generally fairer outcomes in industrial failure
to warn cases.
II. FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIERS
Although the Gray holding has been described as “extend[ing]
10
the duty of suppliers of hazardous products,” the common law
duty of such suppliers to warn ultimate users actually existed well
before Gray. As early as 1919, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
“as a general rule, the manufacturer or compounder of articles for
the market, containing deadly ingredients or qualities, owes a duty
to those into whose hands the articles may come to suitably convey
notice of the danger . . . . This is generally done by naming or
11
properly labeling the package.”
10. Marshall H. Tanick, Changing Times: A Tale of Three Torts, BENCH & B. OF
MINN., May/June 2004, at 24. Mr. Tanick’s article primarily discusses the torts of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, but refers
briefly to Gray to support the proposition that the Minnesota Supreme Court is not
“anti-plaintiff.” Id.
11. McCrossin v. Noyes Bros. & Cutler, Inc., 143 Minn. 181, 184–85, 173 N.W.
566, 567 (1919). In McCrossin, a patient at a mental institution died after adding
an insecticide known as “Roach Doom” to his coffee. The administratrix of his
estate sued both the manufacturer and the seller of Roach Doom. The court,
although it allowed the complaint to be amended to state a cause of action,
speculated that the compound’s name itself—Roach Doom—might be sufficient
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Originally, Minnesota failure to warn claims were based on
12
Then, in 1967, the Minnesota Supreme
negligence principles.
13
Court adopted strict liability standards for failure to warn. During
the 1980s, however, the court moved back toward negligence
14
standards until negligence and strict liability for failure to warn
15
became virtually indistinguishable.
In Gray, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed plaintiff’s
negligence-based failure to warn cause of action, expressly
deferring examination of the strict liability claims also filed by
16
Gray. This comports with current trends; a number of courts are
moving toward analyzing failure to warn claims in terms of
17
negligence, rather than strict liability, and Gray appears to be
another step in that direction.
Minnesota is hardly alone in its attempts to return to
negligence analysis for failure to warn, as shown by the approach

to constitute a warning to humans. Id. at 186, 173 N.W. at 568.
12. George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in Minnesota, the
New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the Reasonable Care
Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 391 (1995) (“Failure to warn in Minnesota
has its roots in negligence law.”); see also Hartmon v. Nat’l Heater Co., 240 Minn.
264, 272, 60 N.W.2d 804, 810 (1953) (holding that where a manufacturer
undertakes to provide instructions, failure to give “accurate and adequate”
warning may constitute negligence).
13. Steenson, supra note 3, at 2 (citing McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278
Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967)).
14. Soule & Moen, supra note 12, at 391-92 (observing that during the 1980s,
Minnesota adopted a negligence standard for failure to warn and citing Germann
v. F.L. Smithe Machine Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986)).
15. Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 926 n.4; see also Steven J. Kirsch, Defenses—
Sophisticated User and Learned Intermediary, 5A MINN. PRAC. SERIES: METHODS OF PRAC.
§ 6.84 (3d ed. 1990) (“Minnesota has recognized that strict liability for failure to
warn is based upon negligence concepts and, in a warning context, there is no
difference between strict liability and negligence.”).
16. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Minn. 2004).
17. Steenson, supra note 3, at 22 (“[T]he court has also stated that negligence
principles apply in strict liability context.”) (citing Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1989); Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works,
430 N.W.2d 465, 467 n.1 (Minn. 1988); Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 926 n.4); see also
John E. Simonett, Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome: Tentative Draft No. 2 of the
Restatement (Third), 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361, 368 (1995) (“[I]t appears strict
liability is becoming more like negligence law with its traditional standard of
reasonable care . . . .”); Hildy Bowbeer, Wendy F. Lumish, & Jeffrey A. Cohen,
Warning! Failure to Read This Article May Be Hazardous to Your Failure to Warn Defense,
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 439, 444 (2000) (“[I]t is apparent that the strict liability
approach to warnings law has been, or is in the process of being, supplanted with
the negligence-based reasonableness standard as to whether a manufacturer failed
to warn.”).
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taken by the recent Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
18
Although the Restatement does not specifically
Liability.
19
prescribe either a negligence or strict liability methodology, it
describes failure to warn liability as achieving “the same general
20
The
objectives as does liability predicated on negligence.”
reporters who authored the Restatement have also come out in
favor of negligence-type liability over strict liability for all branches
21
of products liability except manufacturing defects. It seems that
negligence principles may have unseated strict liability in failure to
warn litigation, at least for the foreseeable future.
In addition to the tension between strict liability and
negligence, there exists among torts scholars a question of how tort
law balances the competing interests of before-the-fact deterrence
of legal wrongs and after-the-fact “corrective justice” when a tort
22
has been committed.
One commentator has proposed that
negligence law “at stage one, seeks to deter negligence generally . .
. then, at stage two, acknowledges the incomplete success of its
18. The Restatement attempts to introduce more consistency among
jurisdictions. Professor James Henderson, one of the Reporters responsible for
the Restatement, has said, “[t]he revision . . . is not a reform measure. We are
trying to read the cases and by and large conform to the trends that we see in
them.” James Henderson, Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social
Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV. 107, 111 (1993) (discussing the development of the
(at that time) unfinished Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998); see also Soule &
Moen, supra note 12, at 389–90 (“The Restatement (Third) avoids the
complications of labeling this product liability theory as either negligence or strict
liability,” but pointing out that the Restatement advocates a “reasonable care
approach.”).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998).
21. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 377 (2002) (postulating that negligence is ethically superior and more
viable than strict liability); Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter’s Perspective: A Proposed
Agenda, 10 TOURO L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1993) (noting that analysis of failure to warn
cases in the new Restatement is intended to be “negligence-like in its approach”
although not necessarily identical to “traditional negligence”).
22. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (proposing a “mixed theory” of tort
law that balances corrective justice and deterrence). Kenneth Simons also
discusses the values expressed through tort law:
In the end, a determination that an actor is negligent reflects a value
judgment at two levels. It expresses the judgment that the actor should
have done something different in light of the foreseeable risks of his
conduct. It also presupposes value judgments about the relevant
advantages and disadvantages of taking such a precaution.
Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Encompassing Fairness As Well As Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 935 (2001).
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stage-one effort and accordingly recognizes the corrective justice
23
rights of those who have been victimized by negligence.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to address these
principles in Gray. By employing multiple defenses with differing
applications, the court has modified an industrial supplier’s duty to
warn without completely eliminating that duty.
Although the newly identified defenses fall short of a perfectly
predictable, bright-line rule, suppliers will have a better idea of
when they are expected to warn because the doctrines are applied
differently depending on whether the court is focusing on an end
user or an intermediary employer. Suppliers will also have greater
flexibility in providing those warnings; when reasonable, they may
rely on an intermediary employer to pass along the warning to the
24
ultimate users of the material.
At the same time, the
reasonableness requirement deters suppliers from unreasonably
abandoning warnings altogether because plaintiffs may still recover
through the corrective justice system found in Minnesota tort law.
III. THE GRAY DECISION
Lawrence B. Gray (“Gray”) worked for the same company for
more than forty-seven years, from 1951 to 1998, except for two
25
years of military service in Korea. His employer, Smith Foundry,
used silica sand in its casting processes and purchased a significant
portion of its sand in bulk from Badger Mining Corporation
26
(“Badger”). During his employment with Smith Foundry, plaintiff
Gray was exposed to silica dust created by normal foundry
27
procedures.
Although providers and users of sand have long known silica
28
dust to be dangerous, Smith Foundry did not begin receiving
warnings from its suppliers about silica’s particular hazards to

23. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1828 (describing deterrence and corrective
justice theories as both “complementary” and “concurrent”).
24. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 277–78 (Minn. 2004).
25. Id. at 271.
26. Id.
27. Id. The sand is used to make molds for metal casting. Once an item is
cast, the sand is forcefully removed from the casting by processes such as “knock
off, shake out, chipping, and grinding.” Appellant’s Brief at 7, Gray (No. C4-022052).
28. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 5, Gray (No. C4-02-2052)
(citations omitted).
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29

foundry workers until the 1970s. By the 1980s, Smith Foundry
had brought itself into compliance with the silica exposure
standards required by the Occupational Safety and Health
30
Administration (“OSHA”), but apparently this was insufficient to
31
Although Gray wore disposable
protect employees like Gray.
32
respirators supplied by his employer, he contracted silicosis, a
33
lung injury caused by inhaling silica particles.
Gray sued Badger and other sand suppliers for, among other
34
claims, negligent failure to warn that the disposable respirators he
35
used did not sufficiently protect against silicosis. The defendants
36
filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied
37
these motions, whereupon all defendants except Badger settled.
Badger renewed its motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that it had no duty to warn Gray “because it sold raw material to a
29. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004).
30. Id.
31. See Bergfeld v. Unimin Corp., 319 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2003). Bergfeld is a
similar case out of Iowa, where the plaintiff was exposed to silica sand at the
foundry where he worked. Id. at 352. Although plaintiff Bergfeld was never
exposed to concentrations of sand above the limit set by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), in 1974, another agency, the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) recommended a much
lower limit for silica exposure. Id. The NIOSH recommendation was not binding
on employers, and plaintiff claimed that defendant supplier failed to warn him of
this lower limit. Id. at 353. The Bergfeld court, however, found evidence in the
record that the employer foundry’s subjective knowledge of the NIOSH
recommendation was equal to the defendant supplier’s knowledge. Id. at 354.
Although the Bergfeld court was using “sophisticated user” terminology, the
doctrine it applied most closely resembles the “sophisticated intermediary”
defense defined in Gray.
32. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 272. Many conventional respirators do not
sufficiently filter out tiny silica particles; at a minimum, the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, commonly known as NIOSH, recommends
“respirators with high-efficiency particulate HEPA filters.” Brief of Amici Curiae
Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 6, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).
33. Gray, 664 N.W.2d at 883. Although silica sand is not dangerous in and of
itself, foundry procedures fracture the sand into imperceptible “sub-micron-sized
particles . . . undetectable by senses of sight, smell, or touch.” Id. These
infinitesimal, airborne dust particles may be drawn into the lungs and cause
permanent damage. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 4, Gray “No.
C4-02-2052).
34. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 273. The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to
address Gray’s claims for strict liability for failure to warn, as well as his claims for
breach of warranties of merchantability and fitness for the intended purpose. Id.
35. Id. at 271.
36. Id. at 272–73.
37. Id. at 273.
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39

sophisticated purchaser.”
This motion was also denied.
The
parties then took the unusual step of stipulating to an entry of
judgment for Gray, with the damage amount contingent upon the
results of an appeal of the denial of Badger’s summary judgment
40
motion.
The court of appeals held that Smith Foundry, Gray’s
41
employer, was a “sophisticated purchaser” of silica sand because it
42
The
“knew or should have known of the dangers of silica.”
appeals court then looked primarily to Eighth Circuit cases before
deciding that Badger, as “a bulk supplier of silica sand to a
sophisticated purchaser” had “no duty to warn the user of the
43
dangers of exposure to silica dust.” Gray appealed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of the duty to
warn and Badger’s raw material/component part supplier
44
defense.
Two amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of
45
Badger: one by the American Chemistry Council another by the
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. If the appeal process determined that summary judgment should have
been entered for Badger, Gray would receive $17,500; otherwise, Gray would
receive $75,000. The supreme court noted that such a stipulation was unusual and
was not authorized under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 273 n.2.
Because the parties had consented and the appeals court had accepted it, the
supreme court declined to assert judgment, however. Id.
41. The appellate court appeared to treat the “sophisticated purchaser” and
“learned intermediary” doctrines as identical. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664
N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004). The
supreme court addressed this possible ambiguity in its opinion: “although the
court of appeals mentioned . . . the learned intermediary defense, it ultimately
analyzed the case under ‘sophisticated user’ and ‘bulk supplier’ defenses
. . . . [W]e decline to extend the learned intermediary defense to the
employer/employee relationship in the industrial context.” Gray, 676 N.W.2d at
276 (citations omitted). Later in its opinion, however, the supreme court did
expressly distinguish the learned intermediary defense from the sophisticated user
and sophisticated intermediary defenses. Id. at 275–77.
42. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004).
43. Id. at 886. Minnesota courts may “determine as a matter of law whether
there exists a duty to warn of a danger in a product.” Id. at 884 (citing Germann v.
F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986)).
44. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 273.
45. Brief of Amici Curiae American Chemistry Council, Gray (No. C4-022052). The American Chemistry Council (“ACC”) is an organization representing
“the leading companies engaged in the business of chemistry” and companies who
make and supply “industrial chemical products.” Id. at 3. The Gray court
expressly states that the sand sold by Badger fits under the legal definition of a
“chemical.” Gray, 676 N.W.2d 268 at 274 n.3 (quoting 29 C.F.R.
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46

Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. jointly with the American Tort
47
Reform Association (“ATRA”). A third amicus brief was filed by
48
the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association in support of Gray.
In its opinion, issued March 18, 2004, the Minnesota Supreme
Court found sufficient issues of material fact existed to preclude
summary judgment, in essence finding for Gray because of the
49
parties’ pre-existing stipulation.
The court carefully limited its
50
holding to the case’s specific procedural and factual scope.
Despite the scrupulously defined parameters of the court’s
opinion, Gray will no doubt significantly affect future failure to
warn litigation, especially in the industrial employment context. In
its “duty to warn” analysis, the Gray court identified and defined a
number of specific defenses available to industrial supplier
defendants. The five defenses outlined in the court’s opinion are:
“(1) learned intermediary; (2) sophisticated user; (3) sophisticated
intermediary; (4) bulk supplier; and (5) raw material/component
51
part supplier.”
Two of the defenses are not new to the Minnesota court. The
learned intermediary defense had already been authorized in

§ 1910.1200(c)(2003)).
46. Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and American
Tort Reform Association, Gray (No. C4-02-2052). The Coalition for Litigation
Justice (formerly the Coalition for Asbestos Justice) was formed by a group of
property and casualty insurers whose goal is “to address and improve the silica and
other toxic tort litigation environment.” Id. at 1.
47. The American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) is a “coalition of more
than 300 businesses, corporations, municipalities, associations, and professional
firms” who support “an aggressive civil justice reform agenda.” Some of ATRA’s
goals include: “abolition of the rule of joint and several liability,” “limits on
punitive damages,” “limits on noneconomic damages,” and “stopping regulation
through litigation.” AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, About ATRA, at
http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
48. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).
The Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association (“MTLA”) is an association of primarily
plaintiff’s attorneys who list as one of their objectives “to advance the cause of
those who are damaged in person, property or civil rights and who must seek
redress therefore at law.” MINNESOTA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Mission
Statement, at http://www.mntla.com/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
49. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 281–82 (noting that the court determined that
fact issues existed regarding whether the warnings provided by Badger fell short of
federal requirements or were otherwise inadequate regarding the types of
respirators that should be used to prevent silica inhalation).
50. See id. at 281 (limiting the decision to the “unique procedural posture and
particular facts in the record”).
51. Id. at 275.
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52

Minnesota for pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Additionally,
principles of the sophisticated user defense have long been
53
recognized in Minnesota.
In addition to its discussion of existing defenses, the Gray court
took the opportunity to identify three additional defenses for
application in Minnesota. First, the court adopted the Raw
Materials/Component Supplier defense from the Restatement
54
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 5. This defense has
been thoroughly discussed by commentators and is fairly
55
straightforward in its application.
The other two defenses,
sophisticated intermediary and bulk supplier, were taken from
56
section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. These “new”
defenses are likely to cause the greatest changes in the litigation of
industrial failure to warn claims.
The sophisticated intermediary and bulk supplier defenses are
the primary focus of this Note, but, to provide context, all five
defenses are discussed briefly in the following section.
A. The Learned Intermediary Defense
As described by the court, the learned intermediary defense
applies where a pharmaceutical maker fails to warn an already
knowledgeable physician of a hazard posed by the manufacturer’s
pharmaceutical product, and a patient is subsequently injured by
57
the product. The learned intermediary defense applies principles
of causation; when a physician is fully knowledgeable of the
52. Id. at 276 (citing Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 335–36, 181
N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970)).
53. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276–77 (citing Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279
Minn. 336, 340–44, 156 N.W.2d 898, 902–04 (1968)).
54. Id. at 280-81 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 cmt.
b (1998)).
55. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users:
Encouraging The Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1224-25 (1996) (comparing raw material and bulk supplier
defenses); Steenson, supra note 3, at 32-34 (commenting on the Restatement
(Third) and its likely effect on Minnesota law). The Gray court adopted this
defense from the Restatement (Third) but did not expressly adopt the language of
the Restatement dealing with failure to warn claims. See 676 N.W.2d at 274
(endorsing “the broad statement of principles contained in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 388 [1965]”) (emphasis added)).
56. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278, 280 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 388 cmt. n (1965)).
57. Id. at 275-76 (citing Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 335-36,
181 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970)).
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product’s dangers, the pharmaceutical company’s failure to warn is
58
held not to be the proximate cause of the injury.
The Gray court pointed out that the learned intermediary
59
defense “has essentially been limited to pharmaceutical products.”
Although the court recognized that the learned intermediary
60
defense may be available in a few other professional contexts, it
specifically declined to extend the learned intermediary defense to
61
industrial employment situations. However, because Badger did
62
not argue to the court for the learned intermediary defense, the
court’s discussion of the doctrine is probably dictum, and awaits
clarification by subsequent litigation.
B. The Raw Material/Component Part Supplier Defense
As already noted, the Raw Material/Component Part Supplier
defense is derived from the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
63
Liability. For the defense to apply in Minnesota, the component
64
must be “inherently safe” when it is supplied to a manufacturer.
The supplier then has no duty to warn either the buyer or the
ultimate user of the final product in which the component is used,
particularly if the component is a basic material that can be put to
65
“multiple uses.”
The court declined to apply this defense to Badger, holding
that Badger was not a supplier of either safe raw materials or

58. Id. at 276.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects,
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 821–22 (Minn. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
61. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276. In Gray, the court mentioned with approval a
Minnesota Court of Appeals case containing a “well summarized” discussion
differentiating the medical and industrial employment contexts. Id. at 276 n.5
(citing Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 280–81. The Gray court quotes the following section from the
Restatement:
[W]hen a sophisticated buyer integrates a component into another
product, the component seller owes no duty to warn either the
immediate buyer or the ultimate consumers of dangers arising because
the component is unsuited for the special purpose to which the buyer
puts it.
Id. at 281 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 (1998)).
64. Id. at 280–81.
65. Id. at 281.
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66

component parts. As a result, this section of the opinion is also
likely dictum. Significantly, however, the court stated that “[e]ven
where this defense is applicable, the supplier must still provide an
adequate warning to the intermediate purchaser,” particularly
67
where the supplier’s knowledge is “superior” to the purchaser’s.
This means that for a raw material/component part supplier to
have no duty to the ultimate user, the intermediary employer must
be knowledgeable regarding any hazards of the material.
C. The Sophisticated User Defense
The sophisticated user doctrine is commonly used in failure to
68
warn litigation and is available in most jurisdictions. As applied in
Gray, the sophisticated user defense is essentially a bright-line, noduty defense that relieves a supplier of dangerous material from
the duty to warn an ultimate user if the supplier “has reason to
believe that the user will realize [the material’s] dangerous
69
condition.”
The defense originated from section 388 of the
Restatement of Torts, which carried over, without any change, to
70
The Minnesota Supreme
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
66. See id. (finding that the sand was not inherently safe when “used in a
foundry process,” and that the sand did not become a “component of a finished
product”). Therefore, although the court did not expressly so state, the raw
material/component supplier defense could not apply in this case.
67. Id. In contrast, in their brief, the Coalition for Litigation Justice and
ATRA claimed that the duty to warn should not lie with the supplier, but with the
employer. Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and
American Tort Reform Association at 15–19, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).
68. “[I]t would appear, then, that some version of a ‘sophisticated purchaser’
defense is the norm in most jurisdictions.” Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d
1191, 1197 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992) (quoting In re
Asbestos Litig. (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986)).
69. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276.
70. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) reads as follows:
§388. Chattel Known to Be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another
to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to
use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its
probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the
manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the
supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
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Court expressly endorsed section 388 in 1959. The court took
72
notice of the Second Restatement section in 1967, and recognized
the principles of the sophisticated user defense (without referring
73
to it by name) in 1968.
In Gray, the court reaffirmed its
endorsement of the Second Restatement, confirming the defense’s
74
place in Minnesota jurisprudence.
D. The Sophisticated Intermediary Defense

75

The newly named sophisticated intermediary defense,
identified in Gray, applies when a supplier can demonstrate that it
reasonably discharged its duty to warn an end user by relying on an
76
informed intermediary to give the actual warning. Although the
77
Minnesota court identified the defense for the first time in Gray,
its elements are not new. As early as 1923, the New York Court of
Appeals stated that “an instrument which may be dangerous and is
generally known to the . . . profession as a danger need not be
78
warned against by a seller.”
Over the years, jurisdictions have applied the defense in
various ways. Some require the same elements but use different
79
nomenclature,
including
“sophisticated
purchaser,”
80
“knowledgeable purchaser,” and “knowledgeable, sophisticated
81
Others evaluate the intermediary’s duty under the
employer.”
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
71. See Mikel v. Aaker, 256 Minn. 500, 504–05, 99 N.W.2d 76, 79–80 (1959).
72. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333 n.1, 154 N.W.2d
488, 497 n.1 (1967).
73. See Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 340–44, 156 N.W.2d
898, 902–04 (1968).
74. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276–77.
75. The court may have selected the name for this defense from an amicus
brief which referred to Smith Foundry as a “‘sophisticated’ intermediary user.”
Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and American Tort
Reform Association at 14, Gray (No. C4-02-2052). The MTLA’s brief also used the
term but treated it as interchangeable with “learned intermediary.” Brief of Amici
Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 8–9, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).
76. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276–77.
77. Id. at 277.
78. Rosebrock v. Gen. Elec. Co. & Tonawanda Power Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 238–
39 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1923).
79. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig. (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1205–08
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
80. See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 739 (3d Cir. 1990).
81. See, e.g., Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 561 (W.D. Va.
1984), aff’d sub nom., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 11
NELSON (CB & CKI & LSK)

672

11/14/2004 6:01:39 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

82

already existing sophisticated user analysis.
Still others merely
extend the pharmaceutically related learned intermediary
83
defense.
A few courts will not permit the sophisticated
84
intermediary defense at all, especially in strict liability cases.
According to the Gray decision, Minnesota now permits the
sophisticated intermediary defense, but distinguishes it from the
85
learned intermediary and sophisticated user doctrines.
Additionally, unlike the sophisticated user defense, the
sophisticated intermediary defense in Minnesota is not a no-duty
defense; it does not obviate a Minnesota supplier’s original duty to
86
warn.
E. The Bulk Supplier Defense
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court discusses the bulk
supplier and sophisticated intermediary defenses separately, the
two are complementary. The bulk supplier defense is a “specialized
version” of the sophisticated intermediary doctrine, dealing with
the supply of bulk industrial materials to an informed
87
intermediary. Because the two correspond so closely, discussion
of the sophisticated intermediary defense often includes the bulk
88
supplier defense by implication.
82. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1194–99 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990); Tasca v. GTE Prod. Corp., 438 N.W.2d 625, 628–29 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487, 495–502 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2001).
83. See, e.g., Stuckey v. N. Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.
1989). See generally Cheney, supra note 4, at 562 (recommending extension of
learned intermediary defense to employers). The Gray court expressly rejected
this option. 676 N.W.2d 268, 275–76 (Minn. 2004).
84. See, e.g., Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 851 (5th Cir. 1992)
(declining to fuse sophisticated user and bulk seller defenses because it would
undercut strict liability); Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1012–
13 (8th Cir. 1989) (declining to fuse sophisticated user and bulk supplier
defenses; also refusing to apply learned intermediary defense to employer–
employee relationship). But see Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc.,
671 F. Supp. 1055, 1058–60 (D. Md. 1987) (permitting sophisticated user defense
in strict liability claim against bulk supplier); Phillips v. A.P. Green Refractories
Co., 630 A.2d 874, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (permitting sophisticated user
defense to strict liability claims against bulk silica supplier); Wood v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 119 S.W.3d 870, 874 (applying bulk supplier doctrine to
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A failure to warn claim).
85. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 275–80.
86. Id. at 278.
87. Id. at 280.
88. Id.
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Basically, the bulk supplier defense applies when it would be
“exceedingly costly” or “impossible” for a supplier of industrial bulk
89
material to warn every end user of that material directly.
Minnesota still requires a bulk supplier to provide adequate
warnings to intermediary purchasers for dissemination to ultimate
90
users, so the bulk supplier, like the sophisticated intermediary, is
not a no-duty defense.
IV. THE SOPHISTICATED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE APPLIED IN GRAY
Generally, courts adopting a sophisticated intermediary
91
defense have taken one of three routes. The first is a commonlaw, “no-duty” approach: once a relevant intermediary (generally
the user’s employer) is warned, the manufacturer no longer has a
92
duty to warn the end user. The second focuses on the supplier’s
reasonableness in relying on an intermediary to give the actual
93
warning. Some jurisdictions refer to this as “delegating” the duty
94
to warn. The third approach combines the previous two. Like the
second approach, it examines whether a supplier was reasonable in
relying on an intermediary, but it also emphasizes the supplier’s
95
continuing duty to the end user. This appears to be the approach
adopted in Gray. The court requires a supplier to demonstrate
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Willner, supra note 1, at 590–606 (discussing differences between the
three approaches to sophisticated user defense). Willner also notes that a few
courts analyze such cases under causation, with limited success. Id. at 588–89 n.47.
92. See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1990); Stuckey
v. N. Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1989); Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson
Co., 623 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1980).
93. Willner, supra note 1, at 596–604 (discussing Restatement analysis of
sophisticated user); see, e.g., Baker v. Monsanto Co., 962 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Ind.
1997); Hegna v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 822 (D. Minn.
1992); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff’d sub
nom., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985); Younger v. Dow Corning Corp.,
451 P.2d 177 (Kan. 1969); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
94. See, e.g., Taylor v. Monsanto Co., 150 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 1998); Adams v.
Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1984); Vines v. Beloit Corp., 631 So.
2d 1003 (Ala. 1994).
95. Willner, supra note 1, at 605–06 (discussing “mixed” approach to
sophisticated user defense); see, e.g., Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192
(7th Cir. 1983); Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.
1978); Dole Food Co., Inc. v. N.C. Foam Indus., Inc., 935 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997); Jodway v. Kennametal, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 883 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Haase
v. Badger Mining Corp., 669 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
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“that it used reasonable care in relying upon the intermediary” to
96
97
warn, but the supplier cannot itself be absolved of the duty.
In adopting its sophisticated intermediary defense, the Gray
court applied the balancing test found in section 388 of the
98
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under the Restatement, a court
must consider “the purpose for which the product is to be used, the
magnitude of the risk, the burden of providing direct warnings to
99
end users and the reliability of the intermediary as a conduit.”
A. Availability of the Defense.
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the availability of
the sophisticated intermediary defense depends on the knowledge
of the intermediary—usually an employer, as in Gray—rather than
100
that of the ultimate user of the material. Unlike the sophisticated
user defense, however, the sophisticated intermediary defense is
101
The duty to warn continues to exist; it is
not a no-duty rule.
merely the physical delivery of the warning that may shift from the
102
supplier to the employer, where reasonable.
The court also noted that the bulk supplier defense falls within
103
the sophisticated intermediary defense.
The bulk supplier
defense acknowledges that the burden of warning end users, if
placed upon suppliers of bulk goods, might be costly, difficult, or
104
even impossible.
Thus, a bulk supplier may be able to fulfill its
legal duty to warn end users by providing sufficient warning to its
immediate purchasers, essentially making those purchasers
105
“sophisticated.”
Although the court seemed to indicate that the generalized

96. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 278 (Minn. 2004).
97. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992)).
98. Id. (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 388 cmt. n (1965)).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 277 (explaining that the sophisticated intermediary defense
“focuses on the sophistication of the end user’s employer”).
101. Id. at 278 (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1197 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 280.
104. Id.
105. See id. (noting that the “defense is consistent with the federal regulation
of hazardous chemicals, which requires the manufacturer to provide warnings to
its purchasers. . . .”).
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106

sophisticated intermediary defense would not apply to Badger, it
did find that this bulk supplier defense—the “specialized version”
107
of the doctrine —likely did apply. However, the court also
determined that sufficient questions of fact remained to prevent
108
This would seem to indicate that, except in
summary judgment.
exceptionally clear-cut circumstances, courts might be reluctant to
take this determination out of the hands of a jury.
B. The Sophistication of the Intermediary Will Probably Be Determined
According to a Subjective Standard
The appeals court held that Smith Foundry was a
“sophisticated purchaser” of sand because it “knew or should have
109
In contrast, the Minnesota
known of the dangers of silica.”
Supreme Court found “issues of material fact” regarding whether
“Smith Foundry’s knowledge was equal to that of Badger Mining”
and whether “Smith Foundry shared in the special knowledge
possessed by Badger Mining that disposable respirators were
110
ineffective.”
Although the supreme court did not specifically so
state, its emphasis on Smith Foundry’s actual level of knowledge
and its reliance on Badger’s warnings appears to implicate a
111
subjective, rather than objective, standard.
Respondent Badger Mining’s brief to the Minnesota Supreme
Court emphasized objective knowledge, as did both amicus briefs
112
supporting Badger.
All three briefs suggested that Smith
106. The court did not specifically state whether the defense would apply to
Badger, but noted that “this case is more analogous to the decisions of other
jurisdictions that have denied summary judgment to silica suppliers,” then
mentioned three cases where courts refused to apply the defense. Id. (citing
White v. W.G.M. Safety Corp., 707 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1988); U.S. Silica v.
Tompkins, 92 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App. 2002); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v.
Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App. 2001)).
107. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 281.
108. Id. “Because genuine issues of material fact precluded the district court
from deciding, as a matter of law, that Badger Mining had no duty to warn or that
its warning to Smith Foundry discharged its duty, the district court did not err in
denying summary judgment.” Id. at 281–82.
109. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004).
110. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278–79.
111. See id. at 279–280 (discussing Smith Foundry’s level of general and
specific knowledge compared to Badger as well as its actual reliance on the
warnings provided by Badger).
112. See Respondent’s Brief at 32, Gray (No. C4-02-2052) (“Smith Foundry
knew or should have known how to control exposures to respirable sand particles
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Foundry should have had the knowledge necessary to protect its
113
employees from silicosis, thus insulating Badger from liability.
However, despite Respondent’s urging, the court’s opinion
appeared to require suppliers to ascertain the actual level of
knowledge—both general and specific—of their purchasers. First,
the court looked at whether Badger and Smith Foundry’s
knowledge was “equal” regarding “the general risks of silica in
114
foundry operations.”
Next, the court examined the parties’
relative knowledge regarding the ineffectiveness of disposable
respirators in preventing silicosis, before determining “there is no
evidence that Badger Mining had reason to believe Smith Foundry
115
had such special knowledge.”
Finally, the court discussed in
116
In
detail Smith Foundry’s actual reliance on Badger’s warnings.
other words, according to the Gray court, suppliers may not merely
rely on general industry knowledge or warnings furnished by other
117
suppliers to make an intermediary “sophisticated.”
Instead, the
court left the burden on suppliers to determine the subjective
specialized knowledge of their purchaser—or else to provide
adequate warnings.
Even though industrial suppliers retain the duty to warn,
however, the sophisticated intermediary doctrine still benefits
them. Functionally, the doctrine creates greater flexibility in how a
supplier may provide its required warning. A defendant supplier
may now use “reasonable care in relying upon [an] intermediary to
118
give the warning to the end user.” When combined with the bulk
supplier defense, even a reasonableness standard provides a great
. . . .”) (emphasis added); Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice,
Inc. and American Tort Reform Association at 14 (“[F]rom an objective standpoint,
the potential risks associated with the use of industrial sand have been a matter of
common knowledge among industrial sand users for many decades. As a result,
industrial sand suppliers have no duty to warn employers or users of the hazards
associated with their products.") (emphasis added); Brief of Amici Curiae
American Chemical Council at 5 (“Where . . . a purchaser knows or should know of
potential hazards related to a product, a supplier of the product has no duty to
warn the purchaser’s employees of such dangers.”) (emphasis added).
113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
114. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 279.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 279–80.
117. See id. at 279 (“Evidence of the . . . information that was available to Smith
Foundry from government and industry publications, other sand suppliers, and
the suppliers of respirators. . . . cannot be said to conclusively establish that Smith
Foundry’s knowledge was equal to that of Badger Mining.”).
118. Id. at 278.
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deal of protection for industrial defendants like Badger, because of
the difficulty in directly reaching the product’s users (such as
Gray). Because this doctrine entails an individualized analysis
rather than an inflexible rule, it is actually more likely to place the
warning burden on the party best able to warn.
C. Sophisticated Intermediary v. Sophisticated User
As noted earlier, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly
rejected the no-duty approach to the sophisticated intermediary
119
As a result, the defense is further differentiated from
defense.
the original sophisticated user defense, where there may in fact be
no duty to warn if the end user (rather than the intermediary) is
120
sufficiently knowledgeable.
This makes sense. If the end user is
knowledgeable regarding the existence of a hazard, then any
warning, whether provided by a supplier or an employer, would be
redundant and unnecessary. Failure to provide such a warning
could not be a cause of the harm. On the other hand, if the
ultimate user is not sophisticated regarding a particular hazard,
then the supplier and employer share a duty to warn of that
121
danger, and fault for not doing so should be apportioned among
122
the parties according to Minnesota comparative fault principles.
Arguments do exist for the no-duty approach to the
123
sophisticated intermediary defense, but they tend to benefit
defendants to the detriment of plaintiffs. One such contention is
that unpredictability among jurisdictions forces manufacturers to
allocate inordinate resources to designing warnings, and
manufacturers have little control over how those warnings are
124
Courts are then seen to be
disseminated by intermediaries.
119. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992)).
120. Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 342, 156 N.W.2d 898,
902 (1968). The Hill court noted: “[I]f [the user] had adequate knowledge of the
dangerous propensities of the product . . . no further duty rested . . . to give an
additional warning.” Id.
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2003).
122. MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (2003).
123. See, e.g., Cheney, supra note 4, at 581 (advocating for “no obligation”
version of learned intermediary defense); Joel Slawotsky, The Learned Intermediary
Defense: The Employer as Intermediary, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 1059, 1059–60 (1995)
(recommending adoption of “no-duty” version of defense).
124. Cheney, supra note 4, at 574 (criticizing unpredictability across
jurisdictions; advocating adoption of learned intermediary defense for industrial
users).
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“punishing the manufacturer” when an intermediary is negligent in
125
However, these arguments do not take
passing along a warning.
into account that manufacturers are virtually always the best source
126
of information regarding generalized dangers of their products.
Additionally, federal regulations already mandate warnings to
127
intermediary purchasers.
Requiring a reasonable additional effort
to determine that the appropriate end users will be warned, as
Minnesota does, simply adds an extra layer of protection for those
users.
Proponents of the no-duty rule also argue that imposing
complete liability on a sophisticated intermediary who fails to warn
may create a stronger inducement for that intermediary, who is
128
often closest to the end user and thus “best able to warn.”
However, this argument is weakened when the party best able to
warn is the employer, which is shielded from liability to a large
129
extent by workers’ compensation statutes.
Additionally, a system
that imposes liability only on a “sophisticated” intermediary may
130
motivate a party to remain non-sophisticated.
By adopting the
reasonableness approach instead, the Minnesota court bypassed
131
both problems.
125. Slawotsky, supra note 123, at 1065 (asserting that manufacturer’s liability
for informed intermediary’s failure to warn essentially functions as punishment of
manufacturer).
126. Willner, supra note 1, at 586 (“Manufacturers are usually most
knowledgeable about their products . . . .”). In Minnesota, “a manufacturer is held
to the skill of an expert in its particular field of endeavor, and is obligated to keep
informed of scientific knowledge and discoveries concerning that field.” Karjala v.
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975).
127. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274–75 (Minn. 2004); see
also Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 9–11, Gray (No. C4-02-2052)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f)(1) regarding labeling of hazardous chemicals
and provision of warnings to purchasers).
128. Willner, supra note 1, at 595 (asserting that no-duty rule creates greatest
likelihood of warning to end users).
129. Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988),
overruled on other grounds by 505 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1993).
130. Willner, supra note 1, at 595–96 (noting intermediaries might deliberately
remain ignorant to avoid liability and expense of warning).
131. For a clearly written discussion of the arguments regarding the
reasonableness approach versus the no-duty approach, see Dole Food Co., Inc. v.
N.C. Foam Indus., Inc., 935 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). The Dole opinion
states, in part:
[T]he Restatement rule also encourages sellers to warn intermediaries,
and any greater incentive to do so offered by the duty rule is offset by its
disadvantages, the principal one of which is that it drastically reduces the
incentive for sellers to notify end users. An important source of product
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D. Sophisticated Intermediary v. Learned Intermediary
In addition to rejecting a no-duty approach to the
sophisticated intermediary defense, the Gray court also
differentiated it from the pharmaceutical learned intermediary
132
defense.
Minnesota courts applying the learned intermediary
defense employ proximate cause analysis: when a fully informed
doctor fails to warn a patient, the patient’s harm is not proximately
133
caused by the manufacturer’s failure to warn.
In contrast, the
sophisticated intermediary doctrine focuses on the knowledge of
the end user’s employer, “on the premise that the employer will act
134
in the best interest of its employees.”
Another difference is that medical practices are
distinguishable from industrial practices. A drug manufacturer
may rely on the individual doctor–patient relationship, and a
135
negligent physician is subject to malpractice liability. In contrast,
the industrial employer deals with many employees on a less
personal level, and is largely protected from negligence liability by
136
workers’ compensation statutes, hence the court’s decision to
define two distinct defenses.
Because the Gray court deliberately differentiated between
learned and sophisticated intermediaries, the outcome of each
defense should be distinct. The court’s self-imposed limitations
prevent such a clear separation, however. As it stands, the
sophisticated intermediary defense functions similarly to the
learned intermediary defense: a supplier’s duty can be
discharged—but not absolved—by adequate warning to an

warnings is thereby virtually eliminated.
The second alleged advantage of the duty approach is that it encourages
intermediaries to warn end users. However, the duty rule does not affect
the intermediary’s duty. . . . [I]f the intermediary is . . . an employer, its
behavior is governed by the workers’ compensation scheme under both
the duty and Restatement approaches.
Id. at 881 n.5.
132. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 275–76.
133. Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 336, 181 N.W.2d 882, 885
(1970).
134. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 277.
135. Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515, 1519–20 (D. Conn. 1986)),
overruled on other grounds by Tyroll v. Private Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54
(Minn. 1993).
136. Id.
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137

intermediary.
However, Gray does suggest how future decisions
may distinguish between the two doctrines. The court implies that
an industrial defendant should face a greater challenge in proving
its warning was adequate because certain safeguards exist to protect
medical patients that are not available to industrial or other
138
employees.
V. THE FUTURE OF GRAY
A. Recommendation: Sophisticated Intermediary Doctrine Should Apply
Only to the Industrial Employment Context
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not use Gray to “decide the
full applicability or scope” of the sophisticated intermediary
139
doctrine.
Indeed, by using the name “sophisticated intermediary”
rather than “sophisticated employer,” the court left open the
question of exactly what types of intermediaries might be
implicated. In view of the court’s initial analysis of the defense,
140
which refers solely to “employers,”
it seems likely that the
majority of intermediaries qualifying as “sophisticated” will be
employers, especially because of the court’s limitation of its
141
holding.
Given the ambiguity of the doctrine’s name, however,
its application is not as clearly defined as it could be.
As noted earlier, the court declined to extend the learned
intermediary doctrine beyond the medical context because of the
142
specific nature of the physician-patient relationship.
Sufficient
parallels exist for similarly restricting the sophisticated
intermediary defense to employers. Although not the intense, oneon-one relationship seen between doctor and patient, an
intermediary employer exercises a certain level of control over its
end user employees.
This control is not shared by other
137. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 279 n.7 (explaining that, even under the learned
intermediary defense, drug manufacturer cannot be completely relieved of duty to
warn patient).
138. Id. at 276 n.5 (citing with approval the learned intermediary discussion in
Todalen, 424 N.W.2d at 79, and Hall, 625 F. Supp. at 1519–20).
139. Id. at 278.
140. Id. at 277.
141. Id. at 281.
142. See id. at 276 (declining “to extend the learned intermediary defense to
the employer/employee relationship in the industrial context,” but noting that a
similar defense was permitted in Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein,
354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984)).
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intermediaries and their end users. For example, employers may
require employees to read and heed warnings, to attend safety
meetings, and to take specific training—or get fired.
Employers are also legislatively required to provide safety
training to employees regarding particular hazards of their
143
workplaces.
Individuals who might not otherwise heed warnings
are more likely to pay attention and derive some benefit when
acknowledging warnings is a part of their job requirements.
Additionally, most individuals are aware that longer-term, day-today exposure to harmful materials encountered on the job may
cause more damage than any shorter-term exposure encountered
outside the workplace. Employees are thus more motivated than
other end users to notice and heed warnings.
In contrast, intermediaries such as vendors who sell to
individual consumers have less control over how warnings are
received, and do not benefit from any equivalent to workers
144
compensation insurance.
The danger is greater that warnings
will get lost in transit from supplier to end user, and greater care is
needed to ensure that warnings actually reach ultimate users. If
these suppliers are able to invoke the sophisticated intermediary
doctrine, there will be less protection for both intermediary and
145
end user than the Gray court appears to envision.
Thus, because of the greater likelihood that necessary
warnings might not reach non-employee end users, the
sophisticated intermediary doctrine is best suited for the
employment context. Not only are employers in the best position
to actually become “sophisticated” intermediaries as intended by
146
the court in Gray, but they enjoy greater protection from liability
143. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 10, Gray (No. C4-022052) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ADMIN., Chemical Hazard Communication, OSHA Publ. No. 3084, at 2
(1989)).
144. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Chemistry Council at 2, Gray
(No. C4-02-2052) (noting “significant distinctions between the consumer and the
industrial contexts . . . including the complex interdependency of modern
business relationships and the intricate regulatory environment governing
workplace safety”).
145. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278 (quoting with approval from Kennedy v.
Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123
(1992)). The Kennedy version of the defense requires that, if direct warnings were
not feasible, the supplier must have “acted in a manner reasonably calculated to
assure either that the necessary information would be passed on to the ultimate
handlers of the product or that their safety would otherwise be attended to.” Id.
146. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 277–78 (An intermediary is sophisticated where
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along with better capabilities of passing along effective warnings.
B. The Adoption of Specific Affirmative Defenses Will Weed Out Frivolous
and Weak Claims
The current state of products liability law in Minnesota reflects
the existence of a legal duty to warn as a question of law to be
147
This gives Minnesota
decided by a court, rather than a jury.
148
judges a fair amount of power to decide failure to warn claims.
In the case of the sophisticated user defense, this is probably
appropriate; if the user is suitably knowledgeable, there should be
no failure to warn claim in the first place. In less clear-cut
situations, such as where the end user is not sophisticated, the
court is willing to adopt a mixed approach that requires a closer
analysis of the specific facts—thus, the balancing test required for
the sophisticated intermediary doctrine.
Despite dire predictions that unless the court adopts a harsh,
bright-line, no-duty sophisticated intermediary defense, Minnesota
will become a silicosis plaintiff’s paradise—a “magic jurisdiction”
facing “an influx of suits, overcrowded dockets, and wasted judicial
149
resources” —the Minnesota Supreme Court wisely refused to
create a new absolute defense for suppliers. Instead, the court
sought a middle ground, creating greater flexibility for itself.
This is not to say that industrial suppliers have been left wide
“(1) the end user’s employer already has a full range of knowledge of the dangers,
equal to that of the supplier or (2) the supplier makes the employer
knowledgeable by providing adequate warnings and instructions to the
employer.”). Note that the definition is exclusive to employers. Id.
147. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (citing Prosser
and Keeton, The Law of Torts § 37, (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 328B (1965)); see also Steenson, supra note 3, at 25 (“[U]nder both
negligence and strict liability standards, adequacy is the only issue the jury will
resolve. The jury will not determine whether a reasonable manufacturer would
have provided warnings and if so, what warnings would have been adequate.”).
148. This power continues to be somewhat controversial. Some commentators
have suggested that following Germann, Minnesota courts have improperly taken
on the role of determining whether the standard of care has been met in any
particular case. See generally Soule & Moen, supra note 12 (proposing that courts
should determine only the standard of conduct—i.e., reasonable care—and leave
to juries the question of what that standard entails and whether it has been met);
George W. Flynn & John J. Laravuso, The Existence of a Duty to Warn: A Question for
the Court or the Jury, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 633, 648 (2000) (“The courts should
not determine alone the existence of a duty to warn. When the issue turns on a
reasonably disputed foreseeability . . . the jury should resolve the dispute.”).
149. Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and American
Tort Reform Association at 6, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).
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open to failure to warn liability; in fact, overall, Gray will probably
have the opposite effect. Even though the Gray court essentially
found for the plaintiff, its clarification of the defenses available to
suppliers—specifically, its adoption of the sophisticated
intermediary and bulk supplier defenses—means that industrial
suppliers have greater flexibility in how they provide their
warnings. Indeed, the Gray court found that the bulk supplier
150
defense would probably have applied to Badger.
As noted earlier, Minnesota now has both a no-duty doctrine
for sophisticated users and a reasonableness test for sophisticated
intermediaries. This means that defendant suppliers have two
different arguments to make—and two possible methods to defeat
151
a plaintiff’s claim.
When combined with the bulk supplier and
raw material/component part defenses (and other defenses not
152
discussed here, such as “open and obvious danger”),
these
defenses present a formidable arsenal for defendant suppliers.
At the same time, plaintiffs who are not sophisticated users
(and whose claims are therefore stronger) may have a better
chance of reaching a jury, because the defenses available to the
supplier in that case—sophisticated intermediary and bulk
supplier—require significant fact-based determination. This means
that a few more claims may be filed in Minnesota than in a
jurisdiction with a more rigid defense. However, with the catalog
of defenses outlined in Gray, the court has given itself the tools to
weed through these cases quickly. To prevail, plaintiffs must defeat
the entire list of defenses; as a result, the weakest claims will be
150. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 280, 281 (Minn. 2004).
151. If one thinks of sophisticated user as a “duty-oriented” doctrine and
sophisticated intermediary as a “balancing” doctrine, the difference in approach
can be distinguished as follows:
The duty-oriented analysis is relatively predictable—a desirable
characteristic because it provides some assurance to producers and
suppliers that their communication structures will pass muster in the
courts. However, like most per se rules, the duty approach sometimes
sacrifices fairness for administrative efficiency. The balancing approach,
on the other hand, is more equitable in nature, but is less certain in its
application, than the duty-oriented approach. This uncertainty makes it
difficult for parties to predict when they may safely rely upon
intermediaries to convey safety information to users or consumers.
Ausness, supra note 55, at 1224–25.
152. The “open and obvious” danger doctrine is well established in Minnesota:
“[n]or is there any duty to warn of nonexisting dangers, or dangers that are
obvious to anyone.” Westerberg v. Sch. Dist. No. 792, Todd County, 276 Minn. 1,
10, 148 N.W.2d 312, 317 (1967).
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dismissed or never filed at all, but stronger claims will be
adjudicated more equitably, under a reasonableness standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Justice Simonett has pointed out,
[w]e live in a post-industrial society characterized by
rapidly advancing technology . . . at a time when there is a
clamor for ‘tort reform’ . . . presumably based on a
perceived imbalance in what is fair to require of the
producer-seller of products as compared to what is fair for
the user-consumer to expect. In the nature of things,
these two interests will always be in a state of tension and
aberrations will occur. But generally speaking, over the
past thirty years, products liability law has kept in mind its
purpose to provide, fairly, products that are reasonably
153
safe.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, by introducing the
sophisticated intermediary doctrine, carefully negotiated the tort
reform tightrope described by Justice Simonett. The Gray opinion
attempts to balance the rights of industrial sand providers with the
health and safety interests of industrial employees. Although the
Gray court was reviewing a denial of summary judgment and thus
did not decide the “applicability or scope” of the sophisticated
154
intermediary defense, it did provide some direction for future
courts. The Gray court indicated that, for a supplier to discharge its
duty to warn of a general risk (such as the danger of inhaling silica
particles), the intermediary’s knowledge must be equal to the
155
supplier’s. Additionally, if a supplier has special knowledge (such
as the ineffectiveness of disposable respirators in protecting against
silica inhalation) the supplier must share its knowledge unless it
has reason to believe the intermediary already has that exact
156
In both cases, the focus remains on the supplier’s
knowledge.
157
duty to the user. In Minnesota, then, a supplier’s duty to warn a
non-sophisticated end user cannot be delegated or abrogated—
only discharged by reasonable care.
153. Simonett, supra note 17, at 368 (proposing that despite some problems,
products liability law is evolving to meet the needs of litigants on both sides,
especially through the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability).
154. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278.
155. Id. at 279.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 278.
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Minnesota’s “reasonableness” approach attempts to find a
middle ground between suppliers and end users. If an end user is
well informed, a court may still use the original sophisticated user
158
defense to find that the supplier had no duty to warn. If an end
user is not sophisticated, courts must look to the conduct of the
supplier in getting the warning to the end user, either directly or
159
through an intermediary.
If the supplier’s conduct was
reasonable, the supplier is protected by the sophisticated
intermediary defense.
In general, the adoption of specific defenses offers some
clarification to industrial suppliers as to what is expected of them in
terms of warning ultimate users. Suppliers also have a better
chance to achieve a fair result in failure to warn litigation; when
they can show that the ultimate user of their product was
sufficiently knowledgeable, the court may find that they had no
duty at all to warn.
On the other hand, the Gray court simultaneously adopted a
reasonableness doctrine for use when the end user is not
sophisticated. It also declined to extend the broader, learned
intermediary defense. This means that the court is continuing to
protect non-sophisticated end users and maintain the deterrence
effect intended by the common law duty to warn. Manufacturers
must still take all available steps to warn these end users and cannot
simply rely on employers or other intermediaries without good
160
reason.
When they fail in their duty, and plaintiffs are harmed,
recovery is still possible under corrective justice principles.
By applying a well-reasoned, multifaceted approach to failure
to warn litigation, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Gray
emphasized individual justice over brute efficiency and “one-sizefits all” solutions.

158. Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 345, 156 N.W.2d 898,
904 (1968).
159. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278.
160. Id. (noting that supplier’s reliance on intermediary must be reasonable).
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